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ABSTRACT	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠdisturbances	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoriginated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatest	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
series	 ﾠof	 ﾠepisodes	 ﾠin	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠregions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
unique	 ﾠto	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠfull	 ﾠof	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠand	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠcrises.	 ﾠAre	 ﾠ
crises	 ﾠalike?	 ﾠDo	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshare	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠor,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠare	 ﾠthey	 ﾠstrikingly	 ﾠdistinct?	 ﾠHave	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfrequent,	 ﾠlonger-ﾭ‐lasting	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsevere	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ20th	 ﾠcentury?	 ﾠAre	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
living	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠworld?	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠtell	 ﾠus	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠcomparing	 ﾠpast	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠcrises?	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠSpain.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
objective	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠin	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ150	 ﾠ
years.	 ﾠ Data	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ revised	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ indicators	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ identify	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ crises.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠall	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrises,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠcurrency,	 ﾠbanking,	 ﾠstock	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠand	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠand	 ﾠall	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠcombinations,	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfrequency	 ﾠby	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlength	 ﾠand	 ﾠdepth.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠconclusions	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠhold	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone	 ﾠsole	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
perform	 ﾠan	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
tested	 ﾠin	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠresearch.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ




Los	 ﾠproblemas	 ﾠfinancieros	 ﾠoriginados	 ﾠen	 ﾠEEUU	 ﾠen	 ﾠla	 ﾠsegunda	 ﾠmitad	 ﾠdel	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠson	 ﾠel	 ﾠúltimo	 ﾠde	 ﾠtoda	 ﾠ
una	 ﾠserie	 ﾠde	 ﾠepisodios	 ﾠ	 ﾠque	 ﾠse	 ﾠhan	 ﾠproducido	 ﾠen	 ﾠdistintas	 ﾠpartes	 ﾠdel	 ﾠmundo	 ﾠen	 ﾠlos	 ﾠúltimos	 ﾠaños.	 ﾠ
Sin	 ﾠembargo,	 ﾠlas	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠfinancieras	 ﾠno	 ﾠson	 ﾠexclusivas	 ﾠde	 ﾠlos	 ﾠsistemas	 ﾠfinancieros	 ﾠactuales	 ﾠya	 ﾠque	 ﾠla	 ﾠ
historia	 ﾠestá	 ﾠrepleta	 ﾠde	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠbancarias	 ﾠy	 ﾠcambiarias.	 ﾠ¿Son	 ﾠtodas	 ﾠlas	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠiguales?,	 ﾠ¿tienen	 ﾠrasgos	 ﾠ
comunes	 ﾠo,	 ﾠpor	 ﾠel	 ﾠcontrario,	 ﾠestán	 ﾠclaramente	 ﾠdiferenciadas?,	 ﾠ¿han	 ﾠsido	 ﾠmás	 ﾠfrecuentes,	 ﾠde	 ﾠmayor	 ﾠ
duración	 ﾠ y	 ﾠ más	 ﾠ severas	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ lo	 ﾠ largo	 ﾠ del	 ﾠ siglo	 ﾠ XX?,	 ﾠ ¿vivimos	 ﾠ actualmente	 ﾠ en	 ﾠ un	 ﾠ mundo	 ﾠ
financieramente	 ﾠ más	 ﾠ vulnerable?,	 ﾠ ¿qué	 ﾠ nos	 ﾠ dice	 ﾠ la	 ﾠ historia	 ﾠ cuando	 ﾠ comparamos	 ﾠ las	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ
financieras	 ﾠen	 ﾠel	 ﾠpasado	 ﾠy	 ﾠel	 ﾠpresente?	 ﾠEste	 ﾠtrabajo	 ﾠestudia	 ﾠlas	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠfinancieras	 ﾠque	 ﾠhan	 ﾠtenido	 ﾠ
lugar	 ﾠ en	 ﾠ España	 ﾠ en	 ﾠ los	 ﾠ últimos	 ﾠ 150	 ﾠ años.	 ﾠ Se	 ﾠ han	 ﾠ revisado	 ﾠ los	 ﾠ datos	 ﾠ y	 ﾠ construido	 ﾠ diferentes	 ﾠ
indicadores	 ﾠpara	 ﾠidentificar	 ﾠlas	 ﾠprincipales	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠfinancieras.	 ﾠSe	 ﾠhan	 ﾠconsiderado	 ﾠtodos	 ﾠlos	 ﾠtipos	 ﾠde	 ﾠ
crisis:	 ﾠ cambiarias,	 ﾠ bancarias,	 ﾠ bursátiles	 ﾠ y	 ﾠ de	 ﾠ deuda	 ﾠ y	 ﾠ todas	 ﾠ sus	 ﾠ posibles	 ﾠ combinaciones,	 ﾠ se	 ﾠ ha	 ﾠ
estimado	 ﾠsu	 ﾠfrecuencia	 ﾠpor	 ﾠperiodos	 ﾠy	 ﾠse	 ﾠha	 ﾠmedido	 ﾠsu	 ﾠduración	 ﾠy	 ﾠprofundidad.	 ﾠSe	 ﾠha	 ﾠcomparado	 ﾠ
el	 ﾠcaso	 ﾠespañol	 ﾠcon	 ﾠlos	 ﾠresultados	 ﾠobtenidos	 ﾠen	 ﾠotros	 ﾠestudios	 ﾠrealizados	 ﾠpara	 ﾠmuchos	 ﾠpaíses	 ﾠcon	 ﾠ
objeto	 ﾠde	 ﾠcontrastar	 ﾠsi	 ﾠlas	 ﾠconclusiones	 ﾠgenerales	 ﾠobtenidas	 ﾠen	 ﾠesos	 ﾠtrabajos	 ﾠse	 ﾠmantienen	 ﾠpara	 ﾠ
un	 ﾠsolo	 ﾠpaís.	 ﾠFinalmente,	 ﾠse	 ﾠhan	 ﾠdeducido	 ﾠalgunas	 ﾠhipótesis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontrastar	 ﾠen	 ﾠfuturos	 ﾠtrabajos	 ﾠde	 ﾠ
investigación.	 ﾠ
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FINANCIAL CRISES IN SPAIN: LESSONS FROM THE LAST 150 YEARS
⊗ 
 
"You study history. Can you tell us, then, whether the crisis problem is growing more severe?” 
Lawrence Summer. Former US Deputy Treasury Secretary (quoted in Eichengreen and Bordo, 2003, p.72) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The current financial crisis is one of the dominant macroeconomic features of 
our era. The financial disturbances that originated in the US in the second half of 2007 
with the failure of Bear Stearns, and then in 2008 with the catastrophic bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers, are the latest in a series of episodes in various regions of the world in 
recent years. As recently as the 1990s, currency and financial crises have occurred in 
Europe (the breakdown of the European Monetary System’s exchange rate mechanism 
and the Russian suspension of its foreign debt), Latin America (the tequila crisis in 
Mexico and the Brazilian currency collapse) and East Asia (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand). All of these crises have been costly to varying degrees, 
both in terms of loss of output and fiscal and quasi-fiscal outlays to shore up fragile 
financial sectors. However, financial crises are not unique to current financial systems, 
history being full of banking and exchange rate crises. For those who have studied the 
history  of  money  over  the  very  long  term,  financial  crises  are  not  a  surprising 
phenomenon at all. Since Schumpeter’s “Business Cycles” (1939), we have known that 
financial turmoil is inextricably associated to modern capitalist development. Financial 
instability and crises are part of economic life, as stated by Minsky (1977). Chancellor 
(1999),  in  his  book  on  financial  speculation,  documented  how  financial  crises  have 
stretched  back  at  least  as  far  as  Ancient  Rome  during  the  second  century  BC. 
Kindleberger (2000) provided a list of financial crises dating back to the tulip mania of 
1636 in Holland up to the Asian crisis of 1997 and the subsequent Russian and Brazilian 
crises in 1998. Goodhart and Delargy (1998) created a useful table of international stock 
exchange shocks between 1873 and 1932 for major countries, characterising each shock 
according to size and international impact. Bordo (1986) also provided a catalogue of 
crises, distinguishing between banking crises that interrupt the internal payment system 
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⊗	 ﾠThis paper has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation 
ECO2009-08791. Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the EHES (Geneva, August 
2009), CLADHE-II/AMHE-IV (Mexico, February, 2010), V Iberometrics (Barcelona, March 2011) and 
7
th BETA-Workshop in Historical Economics (Strasburg, May 2011) congresses. We would like to thank 
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and currency crises that disrupt external payment relations. More recently, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008) constructed an impressive dataset of banking and financial crises around 
the entire world dating back to 1800. Hence, from a historical viewpoint, crises are 
depressingly  familiar.  The  only  distinguishing  feature  of  the  financial  crises  in  the 
twentieth century is perhaps that they continue to occur despite vigorous attempts to 
strengthen  international  financial  architecture  at a  t i m e   when  our  understanding  of 
nominal variables, financial markets and banking structures is much greater. 
Are all crises alike? Do they share similar features or, on the contrary, are they 
strikingly distinct? Have they become more frequent, longer-lasting and more severe 
since the 20th century? Are we now living in a more vulnerable financial world? Have 
crises become more systemic? Is the crisis problem growing more severe? What does 
history tell us when comparing past and present crises? 
All of the above are of course relevant questions that merit an answer, some of 
which have already been closely studied by a handful of scholars. This paper chooses to 
address some of these questions for the case of Spain. More specifically, the objective 
of this paper is to study the financial crises that have occurred in Spain over the last 150 
years.  Although  this  study  is  confined  to  a  single  country,  we  believe  it  is  worth 
examining a country-specific historical experience in depth. Firstly, it is difficult to 
compile detailed and high quality data when a large sample of countries is considered. 
In contrast, single country analyses make it possible to use the best available data for a 
country.  Secondly,  such  studies  can  perform i n -depth  analyses  in  order  to  obtain 
empirical hypotheses regarding the main determinants of financial crises.   
Another unique feature of this paper is that it considers all types of financial 
crises and their combinations: currency, banking and stock market and debt crises. A 
study is carried out to ascertain whether one type of crisis has become more or less 
prevalent and also any possible interaction among crises. This is a new approach in 
regard to other studies, which consider banking and currency crises and the combination 
of the two on the one hand, and stock market crises on the other. This paper aims to 
determine the number of crises that have occurred and document their anatomy, that is, 
their frequency, duration and depth (or the output losses incurred) by constructing a 
financial database for the period 1850-2000.  
 An  underdeveloped  nation  in  the  19
th  century,  Spain  has  evolved  into  an 
emerging  nation  and  finally  a  developed  nation  in  the 20
th  century.  Obviously,  this 
progress has not made Spain exempt from the various types of crises. Many of the 3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
bankruptcy and currency shocks in the world have had repercussions in the Spanish 
economy. On many occasions, crises have coincided, while on others they have not. 
This  paper  establishes  the  chronology  of  Spanish  financial  crises  and  compares  the 
Spanish  case  to  the  general  pattern  obtained  in  other  papers,  such  as  Bordo, 
Eichengreen,  Klingebiel  and  Martínez-Peria  (BEKM  2001),  Eichengreen  and  Bordo 
(2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2010) or Barro and Ursúa (2009) for a large sample 
of countries. 
As indicated above, this study aims to ascertain whether financial crises have 
become more frequent and more damaging to the economy. In order to tackle this topic, 
the approach taken in BEKM (2001) and Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) was taken. 
These papers sought to find out whether crises were becoming more severe, especially 
in  today’s  world  of  capital  globalisation.  BEKM  (2001)  addressed  this  topic  by 
distinguishing between banking, currency and twin crises. These authors studied a 21-
country sample that included Spain between 1880 and 1997, finding that twice as many 
crises had occurred since 1973 as in the Bretton Woods and classical gold standard 
periods, being rivalled only by the crisis-ridden 1920s and 1930s. However, they also 
found that crises, albeit more frequent, have not been either longer or more serious in 
terms of output losses. This paper intends to verify whether crises have become more 
recurrent  and  more  severe  in  Spain  and  whether  or  not  Spanish  crises  follow 
international patterns. For instance, do the results obtained in BEKM hold for Spain? Is 
the Spanish case different to the norm?  
As in BEKM, the sample period has been divided into four sub-periods in order 
to compare the most recent years (1973-2000) to more than a century of financial and 
stock market crises, distinguishing the Bretton Woods period (1945-71), the interwar 
years (1919-39) and the long second half of the 19
th century (1850-1913)
2. As Spain has 
progressed from being a backward nation to an emerging and later industrial nation over 
the four periods under study, the aim of this paper is to clarify whether or not financial 
instability has become more systemic, distressing and costly as the country’s per capita 
income has risen. Also, as in BEKM, the comparison effected focuses on three issues: 
the frequency, duration and depth of crises. The question is posed whether crises have 
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 ﾠThe interwar period in this paper begins in 1914 and ends in 1936 because Spain did not participate in 
WWI, but did suffer a civil war between July 1936 and 1939. Consequently, the Bretton Woods period 
dates from 1940 to 1971 for the same reason. 
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been influenced by changes in the type of monetary regime or by changes in financial 
regulatory framework. 
As mentioned previously, the paper considers not only currency and banking 
crises, but also stock market and debt crises and all their possible combinations. Barro 
and Ursúa (2009) analysed stock market crises and economic depressions from 1870 up 
to the present for a large sample of countries (25 in total), also including the case of 
Spain. They found that larger depressions are likely to be accompanied by stock market 
crises  and  that  a  depression  is  highly  unlikely  without  a  stock  market  crisis.  We 
replicate the comparison in this paper for the Spanish economy, matching stock market 
crises and depressions. Finally, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) considered the importance 
of debt crises or “sovereign defaults”. Using a large database comprising 66 countries to 
study debt and banking crises, inflation and currency crises, these authors found that 
banking crises often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises. The database used in 
this research also includes debt crises. 
In summary, the first contribution this paper makes is to study Spanish financial 
crises over the last 150 years. Data are revised and different indicators constructed to 
identify financial crises. The second contribution of the paper is that it considers all 
types of crises, namely currency, banking, stock market and debt crises and all their 
possible combinations. Finally, the Spanish case is compared to the results obtained for 
multi-country analyses in order to test whether the general conclusions obtained in those 
papers hold for one sole country.   
The first five sections detail the methodology used to identify the crises and 
discuss the main features of the data. Section 2 concentrates on currency crises and 
Section 3 examines banking crises. Section 4 analyses currency and banking crises and 
the combination of both (hereafter referred to as twin 1) and compares the results to 
those obtained in BEKM (2001). Section 5 studies stock market crises and performs a 
similar exercise to that in Barro and Ursúa (2009) by analysing whether stock market 
crises coincide with economic depressions and the probability of stock market crises 
and depressions. Section 6 focuses on debt crises. Following this, Section 7 explores 
whether  or  not  all  the  crises  (currency,  banking  and  stock  market  crises  and  a 
combination of them) have become more frequent in Spain and compares the Spanish 
and international experiences. The paper also examines whether the crisis problem has 
grown more severe as Spain has risen from an emerging to an industrial nation. Section 
8 draws some general conclusions and proposes future lines of research.  5	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2. Currency crises 
 
Definition 
A  currency  crisis  may  be  said  to  occur  when  a  speculative  attack  on  the 
exchange value of a currency results in a devaluation (or sharp depreciation) of the 
currency, or forces authorities to defend the currency by spending large amounts of 
international  reserves  or  sharply  raising  interest  rates.  The  simplest  indicator  of  a 
currency crisis is exchange rate depreciation. For example, Frankel, and Rose (1996) 
define  a  “currency  crash”  as  a  nominal  depreciation  of  the  currency  of  at  least  25 
percent in a year, along with a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation
3 on the 
previous year. In this same line, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) identify a currency crisis 
as an annual depreciation of 15% or more of a currency with respect to a relevant 
anchor currency or a reference country, such as the US dollar, the UK pound, the French 
franc or the German DM, or presently the euro. However, as Eichengreen et al (1997) 
point  out,  currency  crises  cannot  be  identified  using  actual  devaluations  because 
speculative attacks are not always successful and authorities can support the currency by 
spending  Central  Bank  reserves  or  raising  interest  rates.  For  this  reason,  they 
constructed a more sophisticated index that not only considers exchange rate changes, 
but also movements in international reserves or interest rate changes. Eichengreen et al 
(1996, 1997) defined the index of currency pressure as a weighted index made up of 
relative changes in the nominal exchange rate, international reserves and interest rates. 
All the variables in their index are relative to a reference country and the weights are 
intended to offset the differences in volatility of each variable.  
The index of market pressure is as follows: 
EMPit = [(α % Δ eit ) + (β Δ (iit – iat) – (γ (% Δrit - % Δrat)] 
where eit is the exchange rate of a currency with respect to an anchor currency, it is the 
short term interest rate of the country considered, iat is the short term interest rate of an 
anchor country and r is the ratio of reserves (R) to narrow money (M1). 
These authors define a crisis as an extreme value of this index: 
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3  This  second c ondi t i on i s  i nc l ude d s o a s  t o omi t  t he  strong t r e nd of depreciations  in hi gh-inflation 
countries from currency crashes.  
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Crisis it = 1 if EMP it > 1.5 σEMP + µEMP 
 where σEMP and µEMP are the sample mean and standard deviation of EMP respectively. 
Although  most  studies  of  currency  exchange  crises  in  the  20
th  century  employ  this 
indicator, this consensus is less clear in long term analyses. For example, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart’s  (1999)  analysis  of  currency  and  banking  crises  for  20  countries  in  Asia, 
Europe, Latin America and the Middle East from 1970 to 1995 excluded interest rate 
differentials and comparisons to a reference country, considering only exchange rate 
variations because of the lack of interest rate data for some countries. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008) focus exclusively on exchange rate depreciation.  
Although this paper considers the EMP index in Eichengreen et al (1997) to be 
the  right  procedure  to  determine  currency  crashes,  there  are  several  difficulties  in 
calculating  it.  The  main  problem  is  obtaining  appropriate  data  for  all  the  required 
variables. In this sense, in order to identify the main currency crises, a comparison is 
made between the results obtained using exchange rate variations, an unweighted EMP 
index
4 and a weighted EMP index
5. Quantitative data have also been combined with the 
information supplied by the literature. All data procedures and sources are included in 
the data appendix.  
 
Main Results 
  As indicated above, a comparison was made between the results obtained using 
exchange rate variations, an unweighted EMP and a weighted EMP. Quantitative data 
were  also  combined  with  other  qualitative  information.  When  using  exchange  rate 
variations, a currency crash was considered a nominal depreciation of the currency of at 
least 15 percent in a year. When a currency crisis appears in consecutive years, it is 
treated as one sole currency crash. According to these criteria, exchange rate variations 
show 8 currency crises (and another which is on the limit of acceptance) using the 
Carreras and Tafunell (2003) series and 11 currency crises (plus two on the limit of 
acceptance) using the £/pts exchange rate from 1850 to 1913 and the $/pts exchange rate 
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 ﾠThe Eichengreen et al (1996, 1997) index weights the variables by the ratio of the inverse of their 
variation,  but  Li,  Rajan a n d  W i l l e t t  ( 2 0 0 6 )  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h e s e  w e i g h t s  h a v e  n o  c l e a r  e c o n o m i c  
interpretation, preferring to assign equal weights. According to these authors, the weights would depend 
on the exchange rate regime (fixed or floating) and precise weights are a combination of market volatility 
and policy reaction functions. 	 ﾠ
5 The weighted EMP was estimated using the same weights over the period and different weights for four 
periods (1882-1913, 1914-1935, 1942-1971 and 1972-2000). 	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from 1914 to 2000. The crises identified by both indexes were in 1898, 1921, 1931, 
1950-51, 1957-1959 and 1983.  
  Using the weighted EMP and the same weights for the entire period, only 4 
currency crises are identified
6. The results are not very different to those obtained using 
the unweighted EMP index, which identifies 6 currency crises, another being on the 
limit of acceptance. If the weights are changed and different in the four sub periods the 
sample is divided into (1882-1913, 1914-1935, 1942-1971 and 1972-2000), the number 
of currency crises is higher. Without considering the 1914-1930 period
7, 5 crises are 
identified and 4 more would be on the limit of acceptance. If the 1914-1930 period is 
included, estimates yield 6 currency crises plus 4 on the limit of acceptance. In this case, 
the EMP captures currency crises in 1883, 1899, 1930, 1943, 1974-75 and 1991, while 
the following are on the limit of acceptance: 1892, 1954, 1958 and 1962. In comparison 
to the literature, the weighted EMP index, using different weights in the four periods, 
appears to capture the currency crises better. Some of these crises are also captured by 
exchange rate variations, in particular 1899 (which this indicator situates in 1898), 1930 
and 1943 (1942 according to exchange rate variations). In the case of 1958 (which 
would be 1957-1959 in the case of exchange rate variations), the situation would be on 
the limit of acceptance in both cases.  
  Finally,  the  results  were  tested  by  revising  the  main  Spanish  literature  on 
currency crises. References were found for the 1883 and 1899 currency crises (although 
Sardá (1948) speaks about 1882 and 1898) and those in 1930 (Palafox 1991, Carreras 
and  Tafunell  2003,  etc),  1957-58  (Serrano  Sanz  and  Castillo  1997)  and  1991  (that 
Serrano Sanz 2006 or Fernández 2000 consider in 1992). Other currency crises referred 
to in the literature, but not tested by the EMP index are 1948-1951 (Serrano Sanz and 
Castillo 1997), 1977 (Serrano Sanz 2006) and 1995 (Fernández 2000).  
  Summarising all this information, the following currency crises are considered: 
1883
8, 1899, 1930
9, 1943, 1958, 1974-75
10, 1982, 1991 and 1995. For Spain, using a 
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6 A total of four crises are obtained when the 1914-1930 period is excluded (when there are no data on the 
variation of reserves for Spain) and when estimates of reserve variations from Martin-Aceña (1985) are 
used for this period, one further crisis is found to be on the limit of acceptance. 	 ﾠ
7 As mentioned in the previous footnote, we compare results both including and excluding the 1914-1930 
period because there is an interruption in the reserves series.	 ﾠ	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8 A significant banking crisis occurred in 1882, as we will see in the next section, but for practical 
purposes it will be considered a twin crisis (currency and banking crisis). 	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠAs in the 1883 crisis, the crisis in 1931 will also be treated as a twin crisis (currency and banking) for 
practical purposes, as there was also a banking crisis that year. 	 ﾠ8	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weighted EMP for a broad sample of countries and other qualitative information, Bordo 
et al (2001) identified currency crises for the 20
th century in 1931-32, 1958, 1967, 1971, 
1976, 1982, 1992 and 1995. Therefore, results do not entirely coincide. The detailed 
results obtained by the various indicators used are presented in Table 1.  
 
 
3. Banking crisis 
 
Definition 
A  banking  crisis  entails  financial  distress  that  erodes  banking  system  capital 
(BEKM 2001). In most cases, banking crises involve bank runs or failures that force the 
government  to  intervene.  Banking  crises  are  difficult  to  identify  empirically,  partly 
because of the nature of the problem and partly because of the lack of relevant data 
(IMF,  1998).  As  regards  the  definition  of  an  actual  crisis,  Dermiguc-Kunt  and 
Detriagiache  (1998)  consider  that  there  is  a  banking  crisis  when  the  ratio  of 
nonperforming assets to total assets in the banking system exceeds 10%, the cost of the 
rescue operation is at least 2% of GDP, banking sector problems result in a large scale 
nationalisation of banks and extensive bank runs take place or emergency measures 
such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays or generalised deposit guarantees are 
enacted by the government in response to the crisis. However, as Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008a&b)  indicate,  it  is  difficult  to  employ  this  approach  in  a  historical  analysis. 
Although  data  on  bank  deposits  are  readily  available  for  most  countries  and  could 
therefore  be  used  to  identify  crises  associated  with  runs  on  banks,  most  banking 
problems in recent years have not derived from the liability side of bank balance sheets. 
Banking  crises  generally  stem  from  the  assets  side  of  bank  balance  sheets  -from  a 
protracted deterioration in asset quality. The problem is that variables such as the share 
of nonperforming loans in bank portfolios or other indicators of business failure are not 
readily available or are incomplete for many countries. Given these limitations, banking 
crises have usually been dated by researchers on the basis of a combination of events, 
such as the forced closure, merger, or government takeover of financial institutions, 
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runs  on  banks,  or  the  extension  of  government  assistance  to  one  or  more  financial 
institutions.  
This paper uses both quantitative and qualitative information in order to identify 
the main Spanish banking crises. In this sense, the following quantitative indicators are 
used: firstly, real bank stock prices. The peak-to-trough method is used and a crisis is 
defined as cumulative, multi-year returns of -0.25. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) 
indicate, “the relative price of bank stocks would be a logical indicator”. However, they 
did not use that indicator due to lacking data for most of the countries in the sample. 
However,  data  are  available  on  real  bank  stock  prices  for  three  markets  in  Spain 
(Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid) and this can be a useful indicator of banking crises. 
Secondly, the number of banks and bankruptcies and the name and size of banks that 
have closed, merged or been taken over by the public sector. Thirdly, a significant fall 
in real banking profitability is used to identify crises. The fourth indicator this research 
uses is the changes in bank deposits, a crisis being identified when a significant change 
is  observed  that  could  indicate  a  bank  run.  Finally,  other  complementary  ratios  are 
considered, including credits and loans/GDP and credit and loans/deposits. See data 
appendix for definitions and sources.   
 
Main results  
In  reference  to  banking  crises,  the  Spanish  literature  mentions  the  following 
between 1850 and 2000: 1866, 1881-1882, 1890, 1913-1914, 1920-1921, 1924-1925, 
1931 and 1976-1977. As can be seen in Table 2, the indicators used identify these 
crises, with the exception of the 1920 crisis, which can only be detected in the analysis 
of the number of banks and the change in deposits
11. As a result, eight banking crises 
are  identified  over  that  period
12.  Some  of  those  banking  crises  coincided  with 
international banking crises. More specifically, the 1866 crisis was linked to the failure 
of a discount bank (Overend, Gurney and Company) in London, the 1881-82 crisis was 
associated to the so-called "febre d’or" (gold fever) that broke out in Barcelona, the 
crash of 1890 was linked to the international crisis caused by the Argentine Republic 
going into default and its impact on the Baring Brother finance house and the London 
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11 For more information on banking crises, see Martin-Aceña, Pons and Betrán (2009a,b) and for the 
1866 crisis, see Navas and Sudriá (2007).	 ﾠ
12 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) do not consider the crises in 1866 or 1881-1882. The war period between 
1936 and 1939 was also excluded from the sample period. 	 ﾠ10	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financial  market  and  the  1931  crisis w a s   connected  to  the  spread  of  the  Great 
Depression. Figures 1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3 and 4 and Table 3 illustrate the trends of the main 
banking indicators used in this research: real banking profitability, change in deposits 
and the ratios of credit and loans/deposits and credit and loans /GDP.  
4. A combination of currency and banking crises 
Frequency of currency, banking and twin crises 
In addition to these two single types of crises (currency and banking), another 
type combining the elements of both has been calculated. This exercise is justified by 
the fact that a crisis is a complex phenomenon and in many cases is the result of a 
combination of events. Currency and banking crises (hereafter twin 1) are the most 
widely  studied  and  refer  to  the  simultaneous  occurrence  of  banking  and  currency 
problems. Spain suffered three twin 1 crises between 1850 and 2000, namely in 1882, 
1931 and 1976. The BEKM (2001) research for Spain only considers the 1931 twin 
crisis.  
According to the standard definition, the frequency of a crisis is the number of 
crises divided by the number of year observations, by period. The exercise has been 
carried out for four periods (1850-1913, 1914-1936, 1940-71 and 1973-2000) and the 
results are summarised in Figure 5. Our findings show that the most unstable period was 
1914-1936,  as  a  consequence  of  the  high  probability  of  suffering  a  banking  crisis 
(13.6%) or a twin 1 crisis (4.5%). In contrast, the most stable period was 1940-1971, 
when  banking  crises  were  non-existent,  while  currency  crises  were  more  frequent 
(6.5%) than in the previous periods (1850-1913 and 1914-1936). Finally, the post-1972 
years reveal an increase in the frequency of currency and twin 1 crises (11.1% and 3.7% 
respectively). In general, banking crises were more frequent in the first two periods 
(1850-1913 and 1914-1936) and currency crises in the second two periods (1940-71 and 
1973-2000). 
The results for Spain are similar to those obtained in BEKM (2001) for a broad 
sample of countries. As Table 4 shows, the period greatest instability coincided with the 
interwar period. However, with the exception of the 1940-1973 period, the frequency of 
crises  is  higher  in  Spain  in  the  rest  of  sub  periods  than  in  the  BEKM  sample. 
Considering the different types of crises, exceptional banking instability is observed 
during the interwar period, which is even greater in the Spanish case than in the BEKM 
sample. Banking crises are also more frequent than in the BEKM sample during the 11	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periods 1850-1913 and 1919-1936. However, low instability is observed from 1945 to 
1971 as a consequence of banking crises being non-existent, despite the relatively high 
frequency of currency crises (around 6.5%). These results are very similar to those 
obtained by BEKM (2001). One explanation given for the absence of banking crises is 
that regulations in the Bretton Woods era were so restrictive and capital flows were so 
low that there were no causes for banking crises. The situation in Spain was similar. The 
civil  war  broke  out  at  a  time  of  financial  self-regulation  and  the  Franco  regime 
prompted the imposition of structural controls and a shift in bank supervision away 
from market discipline and towards government discretion. As Pons (2002) argued, the 
strong regulatory framework in the Franco era reduced the instability of the banking 
system  by  sacrificing  competition.  Banks  and  saving  banks  in  difficulties  were 
systematically rescued by the Bank of Spain and financially sound banks with the fiscal 
support and under the auspices of supervisory authorities merged with and acquired 
banks in trouble. This was the other alternative used to avoid bankruptcies.  
Does the frequency of crises depend on the globalisation of capital? Are crises 
more frequent without capital controls or do they depend on the nature of monetary and 
financial regimes? Has Spain suffered more crises with a fixed or a floating exchange 
rate? These questions warrant attention because of their significant policy implications, 
as BEKM suggested. 
In terms of capital controls and monetary and financial regimes, the 1850-1913 
period was characterised by a floating exchange rate regime, as Spain never adopted the 
gold standard due to the absence of capital control and the lack of regulation of the 
financial system. The main features of the interwar years (1914-1936) were a (dirty) 
floating  rate  regime,  capital  controls  and  a  lightly  regulated  banking  system.  The 
prevailing  elements  of  the  Spanish  regime  from  1940  to  1971,  as  was  the  case 
elsewhere,  were  a  fixed  exchange  rate  with  capital  controls  and  a  strictly  regulated 
financial  system.  The  last  period,  on  the  contrary,  exhibited  completely  opposite 
characteristics, namely a flexible exchange rate, no capital controls and a deregulated 
financial system. 
As  regards  the  globalisation  of  capital,  BEKM  (2001)  pointed  out  that  the 
frequency of crisis in the two periods of globalisation (1850-1913 and 1973-2000) was 
different and that, consequently, globalisation did not seem to be a determinant of how 
frequently a crisis is suffered. Different crisis frequencies are also obtained for the two 
periods  in  the  case  of  Spain,  crises  being  more  frequent  in  the  1973-2000  period. 12	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Moreover, according to BEKM (2001), the reason for the relatively high frequency of 
currency  crises  in  the  periods  1940-1971  and  1973-2000  does  not  appear  to  be  the 
globalisation of capital, because 1940-1971 was not a period of globalisation. However, 
they suggest it could be linked to the process of democratisation, which could have 
made maintaining currency policy discipline more difficult. However, this argument 
cannot  be  maintained  in  the  Spanish  case,  as  during  the  Franco  dictatorship  the 
frequency  of  currency  crises  was  also  very  high.  In  this  case,  balance  of  payments 
problems  could  have  been  the  result  of  the  inherent  disequilibrium  of  an  emerging 
country in years of intense growth.   
  The exchange rate regime has not had a great influence on the frequency of 
crises  either.  The  sixty-five  years  of  nearly  clean  floating,  from  1850  to  1913,  and 
unrestricted capital mobility coincided with a period in which the frequency of (all) 
crises was lower. However, when Spain changed from a clean rate to the dirty floating 
rate  that  characterised  the  interwar  years,  banking  or  twin  1  crises  became  more 
frequent.  Furthermore,  an  increase  in  crisis  frequency  is  observed  in  the  last  two 
periods, when the exchange rate in Spain went from fixed to flexible. Hence, there are 
two periods with a floating exchange rate (1850-1914 and 1970-2000) which recorded 
very different results in terms of crisis frequency.  
  Finally, it is worth commenting in relation to financial regulation that banking 
crises were more frequent in the less regulated periods (1850-1913 and 1914-1936) than 
the most regulated years (1940-1971). 
The final point in this section touches on another BEKM preoccupation: are 
emerging  economies  more  crisis-prone?  Does  the  frequency  rate  decrease  when  a 
country graduates as an industrial nation? BEKM results, when a large sample of 56 
developed and less developed countries are examined, suggest that crises have been 
predominantly  concentrated  in  emerging  markets.  In  other  words,  crises  are  more 
frequent in emerging countries than in industrialised nations. 
  Over the 150-year sample period used in this research, Spain progressed from 
being  underdeveloped  before  1914  to  an  emerging  nation  between  1914  and  1971, 
becoming an industrialised country thereafter. So, have crises become more frequent? 
Has the crisis problem become more prevalent? It is difficult to find a straightforward 
answer to these questions. The most that can be said is that during the transition from an 
emerging to an industrial nation, the crisis frequency rate in Spain rose from 6.5% 
increase over the 1945-1972 period to 14.8% in the 1973-2000 period (see Table 4). Not 13	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only was the frequency of crises different before and after 1973, but the frequency of 
currency  and  twin  crises  was  also  notably  different.  In  particular,  the  frequency  of 
currency and twin 1 crises is clearly higher in the post-1972 period than before. In this 




Duration and depth of currency, banking and twin crises  
  Recovery time is defined as the number of years until GDP growth returns to its 
pre-crisis  trend.  By  definition,  minimum  recovery  time  is  one  year.  The  depth  or 
severity  of  a  crisis  is  the  cumulative  loss  of  output  estimated  by  summing  the 
differences between trend growth and output growth after the crisis until the time when 
annual output growth has returned to its trend. 
Quantifying the length and depth of a crisis is not a simple task, as it requires 
calculating  the  growth  trend  of  the  economy  and  defining  the  pre-crisis  period  of 
comparison (three, five or more years of normal growth) with the actual growth during 
the crisis. The IMF uses the GDP growth rate for the three years preceding the event, 
while BEKM computes the GDP growth rate over the five years preceding the event. As 
considering three or five years to determine the pre-crisis trend is an ad-hoc solution 
and, moreover, the years prior to a financial crises are in most cases characterised by an 
expansion or extra-growth, this paper takes a different approach. The growth trend in 
this case derives directly from the different phases of growth defined by Prados (2003). 
In his paper entitled “El progreso económico de España” (Spain’s Economic Progress in 
English), he estimated average growth rates for periods delimited by two peak years. 
This alternative was chosen because the three or five-year average growth rate for Spain 
was not sufficiently representative of the long term growth rate. In this case, potential 
growth is better captured by the growth rate of a full cycle, as defined by Prados (2003). 
BEKM sustain that the recovery time from crises appears to be similar in the 
four periods under examination. However, crises seemed to be more severe between 
1880 and 1913 than after 1973. Moreover, the output loss from currency crises in recent 
times is only two-thirds of that before 1913, while for banking crises, the figure was 
between 75% and 80%. Also according to BEKM, twin crises have become more severe 
since 1973, although output losses are not on the same scale as in the interwar years, 
particularly for emerging markets. In all periods, output losses were greater in emerging 
markets than in industrial countries. The average decrease in output following a crisis in 14	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a sample of ten emerging markets is greater in the post-Bretton Woods era than the 
average fall in output following a crisis in any other period in the twentieth century. 
Our results for the specific case of Spain are shown in Table 5. For "all crises" it 
appears obvious that the worst performance has been recorded in the latest period. The 
pre-crisis growth rate has taken longer (double the time) to recover than in any of the 
other three periods. In fact, recovery took as long as 4.5 years, compared to an average 
of 2 years for the other three periods. Moreover, post-1973 crises have not only lasted 
longer, but also been more severe, with a cumulative GDP loss as high as 14.54%, twice 
that of 1850-13 and three times the output losses in the interwar and Bretton Woods 
years. This result is in sharp contrast to the well-known conclusions reached by BEKM, 
for whom crises had grown more frequent but not more severe after 1973 (Table 7). The 
difference can be explained by the extraordinary severity of the twin crisis that occurred 
in the late 1970s. This was partly due to the impact of the deep industrial recession that 
took place during the transition from a dictatorship to democracy, and also to the slow 
adaptation of the Spanish economy to the more open and integrated economy of the 
former European Community
13.  
Another salient feature of Tables 5 and 7 is the relatively mild severity of the 
interwar  crises  in  absolute  terms  and  when  compared  with  international  experience. 
Duration was shorter and output losses (all crises) lower than in any of the other three 
periods. Industrial backwardness, financial isolation and the sharp depreciation of the 
exchange rate of the peseta against all major international currencies may explain this 
marked difference. There were three (not very severe) banking crises between 1913 and 
1936 and a twin crisis in 1931 (with greater repercussions). If the three banking crises 
are omitted and only the 1931 twin crisis is considered, the results are more similar to 
those obtained by BEKM. 
More detailed information is presented in Table 6, which lists the duration and 
depth of crises by year and type. The longest and deepest was the twin 1 crash in 1976-
77. Complete recovery required a full decade and cumulative output loss peaked at 
49.6%. The other two major disturbances date back to the nineteenth century, namely 
the banking crisis in 1866 and the twin 1 crisis in 1882. Both caused a cumulative GDP 
loss of around 14 %. Moreover, recovery from the latter took as long as six full years. 
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5. Stock Market crises 
 
Definition 
In line with Barro and Ursúa (2009), this paper considers there is a stock market 
crisis when cumulative, multi-year returns are -0.250 or less of the stock price index. 
The peak-to-trough method is applied to obtain the size of the declines
14. This method 
obtains the peak-to-trough period and, in order to establish a stock market crash year, 
we assign the year when the cumulative decline in stock market prices records returns of 
-0.25. See data appendix for definitions and sources. 
 
Main results  
Following the stock market crisis definition, a total of 12 stock crisis in Madrid, 
6 in Barcelona and 4 in Bilbao were identified between 1850 and 2000
15. The peak and 
trough of these crises and the declines in returns are presented in Tables 8 and 9. As can 
be observed in Table 9, there have been 14 stock market crises
16, 12 of which coincided 
with the Madrid stock market, occurring in overlapping or adjacent years, and only 2 in 
Barcelona. In the case of the Bilbao crisis (1900-1902), the crisis from 1900 to 1904 is 
considered,  coinciding  with  the  Madrid  crisis  during  this  period  (1902-1906).  In 
comparison to the case documented by Barro and Ursúa (2009), Spain suffered more 
crises than the USA, even if only the Madrid homogenous market is considered during 
the entirety of the sample period (1850-2000). There were 7 stock market crises in the 
USA between 1869 and 2008 (1907-07, 1916-20, 1929-31, 1937-37, 1939-41, 1973-74, 
2000-02,  2008-08).  If  the  same  period  and  one  market  (the  Madrid  homogeneous 
market) are also taken into account in the two countries (1869-2000), the number of 
crises would be 12 in Spain (in the Madrid stock market) and 6 in the USA. 
 
Stock Market crises and depressions  
The stock market crises will now be matched to the economic depressions as in 
Barro  and  Ursúa  (2009).  Contractions  are  calculated  by  computing  peak-to-trough 
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14 A Hodrick-Prescott filter has also been applied to attempt to gauge long-run, as opposed to transitory 
crises, but this reduced the number of stock market crises considerably, even in the case of those normally 
considered in the literature. As a result, it was not used in this paper.  	 ﾠ
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stock exchange was closed during this period.  
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fractionals that exceed a certain threshold. We consider the limit to be 0.10 as in Barro 
and Ursúa (2008, 2009). There have been 4 macroeconomic contractions or depressions 
in Spain: 1866-1868, 1894-1896 (the period can be considered as 1892-96, as in Barro 
and Ursúa (2008, 2009) for Spain), 1929-33 and 1935-1939, the latter coinciding with 
the  Civil  War  (1936-39),  although  the  period  1877-79  was  closer  to  a  macro 
contraction
17. There were only two contractions in the USA over the period from 1869 
to 2006, in 1917-21 (due to the effect of influenza) and 1929-33 (Barro and Ursúa 2008, 
2009).  
Table 10 presents the matches between stock market crises and depressions and 
Table  11  shows  them  in  three  panels:  1)  stock  market  crises  with  depressions,  2) 
depressions without stock market crises and 3) stock market crises without depressions. 
Three stock market crises with depressions have been identified, 1 depression without a 
stock market crisis and 10 stock market crises without depressions, although the 1871-
74 stock market crisis was close to a depression.   
In the case of the USA, unlike many other countries, there were no depressions 
that were not associated with a stock market crisis. But this was not the case in Spain, 
where the 1892-96 did not include a stock market crisis. Also, the period 1877-79 was 
close to a macro contraction. 
In the study carried out by Barro and Ursúa (2009) considering 25 countries (18 
OECD), matching periods of stock market crises with those of macroeconomic declines 
exist in 58 cases (stock market crashes that paired up with depressions), 26 cases of 
depressions that were not associated with stock-market crises and 137 cases of stock 
market crises not associated with depressions. That means an average per country of 
2.32 stock market crises with depressions, 1.4 depressions without a stock market crisis 
and 5.48 stock market crises without depressions. Spain is above the average in the case 
of stock market crises with depressions (3) and especially in stock market crises without 
depressions (10), but below the average in the case of depressions without stock market 
crises (1). This result could imply that the stock market was not an important means of 
financing investment in Spain and even that the stock market was less developed, for 
which reason the economic repercussions of a stock market crisis were less serious than 
in other countries.  
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were not negative during this period, but were very low in relation to previous years. However, the 
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Table 12 presents the calculations of the frequency of stock market crashes and 
depressions in Spain and this is compared to the case of the USA and the sample of 25 
countries and the sample of just 18 OECD countries measured in the Barro and Ursúa 
(2009) study. In Spain, if one knows a stock market crash (return of -0.250 or more or 
worse) occurred it is 21.43% probable (three out of every 14 stock market crashes) that 
a  depression  (of  size  0.10  or  more)  also  occurred.  Furthermore, i f  one  knows  a 
depression  (of  size  0.10  or  more)  occurred,  it  is  75%  probable  (3  out  of  every  4 
depressions) that a stock market crash (of size -2.50 or worse) also occurred. In all the 
countries in the Barro and Ursúa (2009) sample, if one knows a stock market crash 
(return of -0.250 or more or worse) occurred, it was 29.79% probable that a depression 
(of size 0.10 or more) also occurred. In the case of the sample of 18 OECD countries, 
the probability was 27.7% and in the case of USA it was 28.6%. However, if one knows 
a depression (of size 0.10 or more) occurred, it is 69% probable that a stock market 
crash (of size -0.250 or worse) also occurred, the same probability as in the case of the 
18 OECD countries and 100%, as commented previously, in the USA. Therefore, the 
probability of a stock market crash in Spain, conditional to observing a depression, was 
below the average for the sample of 25 countries, the sample of 18 OECD countries and 
the USA. However, the probability of suffering a depression, conditional to a stock 
market crash was greater in comparison to the samples of 25 countries and 18 OECD 
countries, but smaller than in the USA, where the pairing percentage was 100%. 
Given that the Barro and Ursúa (2009) study obtained a higher probability that in 
wartime a stock market crash would become a depression, non-war periods and war 
periods have been separated in Table 12. However, our results show that the probability 
of a stock market crash, if a depression occurs, is the same in both war and non-war 
periods. In that sense, the probability of a depression in the case of a stock market crash 
in a non-war period in the sample of 25 countries is 20% compared to 30% when all the 
periods are considered, while in the sample of 18 OECD countries the figure drops from 
28% to 17%. In the case of Spain, the probability is also lower, at 14.28% rather than 
21.43%. However, in the war time period, the probability of a depression conditional to 
observing  a  stock  market  crash  is  70%  for  all  25  countries,  compared  to  30% 
previously, while it is 100% in the Spanish case.  
In short, Spain suffered more stock market crises than the USA, than the sample 
of 25 countries and the sample of 18 OECD countries and therefore the more developed 
countries studied in Barro and Ursúa (2009), but the crises had less of an economic 18	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impact than in the countries considered in the comparison. One possible reason for this 
could be that the stock market in Spain was not as important and less developed.  
 
6. Debt crises   
 
Definition 
A debt crisis is considered to be a period where the public debt to GDP ratio rises 
above 100%. In order to identify debt crises, the following indicators are used: a) the 
public debt to GDP ratio, b) international and domestic defaults. Sources can be found 
in the data appendix.  
 
Main results  
  The ratio of domestic public debt to GDP shows two periods of debt crises: 
1874-1891 and 1899-1909. The results are similar when the total public debt to GDP 
ratio is considered, which includes domestic and international debt. In this case, the debt 
crises were identified in 1850, 1868-1882 and 1896-1909. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
consider the following external defaults in Spain: 1851, 1837-1867, 1877-1892 and, 
finally, the intervention of the IMF in 1959, 1960 and 1978 and the domestic default in 
1936-39. The main results are summarised in Table 13.  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, p. 10) take into account periods of international 
sovereign  debt  crises,  using  the  share  of  countries  in  default  or  restructuring  as  an 
indicator: 1) The Napoleonic War, 2) from the 1820s through 1840s, 3) the early 1870s 
lasting for two decades, 4) from the Great Depression to the 1950s, 5) the most recent 
emerging market debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, Spain belongs to the 
third period of international sovereign debt crises. 
 
7. The frequency of all types of crises  
 
As indicated above, the frequency of a crisis is defined as the number of crises 
divided by the number of year observations, by period. In this section we obtain the 
frequency of all types of crises. In addition to the crises described previously (currency, 
banking, twin 1 and stock market), another three have been computed that combine 
elements of individual crises. The following definitions are added to the twin 1 crises: 
twin 2, which is defined as the combination of a banking and stock market crisis, and 19	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
twin 3, which is the combination of currency and stock market crises. These two types 
of crises have received less attention in the literature. However, we have found that in 
the case of Spain, they add pieces of information that are useful to understand the length 
and severity of certain historical episodes. To close the circle, we decided it was worth 
offering  what  we  call  a  "triple  crisis",  an  unfortunate  event  that  involves  the 
simultaneous occurrence of a currency, banking and stock market shock.  
As in section 4, the exercise has been conducted for all four periods and the 
results are summarised in Figures 6 and 7. The interwar period records the highest 
frequency of (all) crises (18.2%). The second period with the highest frequency of crises 
was 1973-2000 (14.8%). When comparing crisis frequency over the last two periods, 
1940-71 (9.7%) and 1973-2000 (14.8%), an increase in instability was observed.  
The main contrast between Figure 5, which only considers currency, banking 
and twin 1 crises, and Figure 6, where stock market crises and their combinations are 
considered, is the relatively high frequency of all crises in the periods 1850-1913 and 
1940-1971 when stock market crises are included. This is due, as commented in the 
previous section, to the fact that there were more stock market crises in Spain than in 
the other countries considered in the Barro and Úrsua (2009) study. Furthermore, stock 
market crises were more frequent in the first two periods (1850-1913 and 1914-1940) 
than in the last two periods (1941-1971 and 1973-2000). 
  As regards the different types of crises, in the period 1850-1913, stock market 
crises were the most common (4.8%), followed by twin 2 (banking and stock market) 
crises (3.2%). Between 1914 and 1936, the most frequent crises were banking, twin 2 
and triple crises (4.5%, 9.1% and 4.5%, respectively). During the Franco regime (1945-
1971), the most frequent crises were currency, stock market and a combination of the 
two or twin 3 crises. In this period there were no banking crises (with a frequency of 
3.2%). In the last period (1973-2000), the most frequent were currency crises (7.4%), 
followed by twin 3 and triple crises (both with a frequency of 3.7%). 
  In  reference  to  combined  crises,  Figure  7  illustrates  that  the  combination  of 
banking and stock market crises (twin 2) only occurred in the first two periods (1850-
1913 and 1913-1936). On the contrary, currency and stock market crises (twin 3) only 
took place in the post 1940 period. However, with the exception of the period 1940-
1971, triple crises occurred in the rest of the sub-periods considered. 
   As far as duration and depth are concerned, the main results when considering 
all types of crises are shown in Tables 14 and 15. The period 1973-2000 was, as in 20	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Section 4 (when only currency, banking and twin 1 crises were considered) the worst. 
Once again, the pre-crisis growth trend took double the time to recover than in any of 
the other three periods. Post-1973 crises were also more severe, with a cumulative GDP 
loss as high as 14.54 per cent. The main difference in regard to the results obtained in 
Section 4 is that in this case the depth of the crises in the period 1850-1913 was not 
entirely dissimilar to those in the 1973-2000 period, with a cumulative GDP loss of 
11.15%.  In  any  case,  considering  all  types  of  crises  generally  confirms  the  results 
obtained in this section and contrasts with the well-known BEKM conclusion that crises 
had become more frequent but not more severe since 1973. As Table 14 indicates, in the 
post-1973 period Spain experienced more severe crises and, as indicated in Section 4, 
the  reason  for t h is  difference  is  the  extraordinary  severity  of  the  triple  crisis  that 
occurred in the late 1970s.  
The  ranking  (in  brackets)  of  crises  in  terms  of  the  largest  output  loss  is a s  
follows: 1866 (3), 1882 (4), 1892 (2), 1931 (5) and 1976 (1), triple crises being recorded 
in  1882,  1931  and  1976.  These  crises  also  coincide  with  some  of  the  main 
macroeconomic contractions (1866, 1892, near to a macro contraction, 1931) analysed 
in Section 5.  
 
8. Conclusions 
  The  objective  of  this  paper  is  three-fold.  Firstly,  to  identify a l l  the  major 
financial, currency, banking, stock market and debt crises that have occurred in Spain in 
the last 150 years, estimate their frequency by period and measure their length and 
depth. Secondly, to compare our findings for a single country with the well-known 
results for currency and banking crises obtained by BEKM for a sample of 21 and 56 
countries and the stock market crises and depressions for a sample of 25 countries and 
another including 18 OECD countries by Barro and Úrsua (2009). Finally, to perform 
an analysis of the main financial crises in order to establish hypotheses that could be 
tested in future research.  
  Although we believe this is the first time this exercise has been conducted for 
Spain or any other individual country, we claim little methodological innovation in our 
approach. However, progress in the study of history is made by taking small steps and 
by adding details to great theories or interpretations. This paper presents quantitative 
analyses for a large number and types of financial crises and compares the crises prior 21	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to 1913 and in the interwar and post-World War II periods. Although this study is 
confined to Spain, this case may serve to test the results for one country against those 
obtained by other studies for a much larger sample in which many details are obviously 
underscored.  
What can be learnt from this exercise? What conclusions have we reached? Do 
they confirm or reject our previous knowledge? Does our story differ from the story told 
by BEKM and Barro and Úrsua? In what follows we briefly summarise our findings. 
A total of 18 crises of various classes and combinations over the last 150 years 
have been identified, which occurred under different monetary and regulatory regimes. 
All crises seem to have been more frequent in Spain than in the BEKM sample. This 
result  is  obtained  even  without  considering  stock  market  crashes  and  other 
combinations. Although Spain records higher crisis frequency in most of the periods, 
the main differences are observed in the first two sub-periods: 1850-1913 and 1914-
1936.  Crisis  frequency  does  not  change  significantly  when  stock  market  crises  are 
included, with the exception of 1850-1913 (from 6.3% to 11.1%) and 1940-1971, albeit 
recording a much smaller change (from 6.5% to 9.7%). Consequently, these two periods 
are now more unstable. 
Crises have been followed by recessions lasting on average 2-4 years, a duration 
not  dissimilar t o   the  2-3  years  recorded  by  BEKM.  All  crises  worldwide  (BEKM) 
recorded an average cumulative output loss of 9.2%, while in the case of Spain the 
figure was 8.9%. Table 14 reveals that this relatively small difference is due to the 
interwar depression, which was milder in Spain. On the contrary, the losses recorded in 
the last period were greater in Spain than at international level. 
Banking crises, either on their own or in combination with currency and stock 
market crises, were more prevalent during the interwar period than in any other. In 
contrast, currency crises took place more often during the period 1945-72, when Spain 
was in the process of graduating as an industrial nation. The rapid transformation of the 
economy during the 1950s and 1960s with high import requirements of raw materials 
and intermediate goods caused repetitive balance of payments disequilibriums, exerting 
strong pressure on the exchange rate. In general, banking and stock market crises and 
their combinations were more frequent in the first two periods (1850-1913 and 1914-
1936), while currency crises and its combinations were more common in the second two 
periods (1940-1971 and 1973-2000).  22	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Our results reveal that stock market crises were more frequent than in the Barro 
and  Ursúa  (2009)  sample.  However,  Spanish  stock  market  crashes  had  less  of  an 
economic impact than in the countries in the Barro and Úrsua sample.  
According to BEKM, crises have become more frequent but not more severe, a 
hypothesis that can be said to epitomise the main argument of their study. Do we have 
robust enough evidence to sustain the same for Spain? As indicated above, what our 
evidence reveals is that the rate of frequency of Spanish crises was high after 1913 and 
has remained high since, in keeping with BEKM. However, the crises in Spain in the 
last period (1973-2000) were more severe than in previous years, although this result is 
due to the intensity of the financial crisis in 1977-82. Therefore, crises have become 
more frequent and also more severe in Spain.  
As  mentioned  above,  the  analysis  in  this  paper  aims  to  establish  some 
hypotheses to be tested by future research. Firstly, are financial crises the price to pay 
for previous periods of extra-growth, as was the case with Spain in the 1860s, the 1920s 
and the 1970s? Is there a relationship between the severity of a crisis and a stronger or 
weaker expansion in the years prior to the crisis? Why did Spanish financial crises have 
a lower impact during the interwar years and a higher impact in the 1970s? Secondly, in 
Spain periods of strong regulation and greater financial stability appear to be correlated, 
but perhaps with the trade-off of less efficiency in the financial sector. What is the 
impact  of  regulation  on  financial  crises?  Thirdly,  is  the  Spanish  financial  crisis 
chronology different to the international pattern? What was the impact of international 
crises  in  Spain?  Are  international  factors  or  autochthonous  factors  the  main 
determinants  of  Spanish  financial  crises?  Which  had  a  greater  impact  on  Spanish 
financial crises? Fourthly, why were stock market crashes more serious in the periods 
1850-1913  and  1914-1936?  In  Spain  (as  in  other  countries),  the  main  macro-
contractions were found to coincide with a stock market crash. So, do financial crises 
and depressions share the same determinants? Are depressions accompanied by more 
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DATA APPENDIX 
Currency crises  
  As  regards  the  data,  there  are  two  options  when  it  comes  to  analysing  the 
evolution  of  the  exchange  rate.  On  the  one  hand,  Carreras  and  Tafunell  (2003) 
constructed an exchange rate series. From 1850 to 1913 they only consider the peseta/£ 
exchange rate, from 1914 to 1936 the exchange rate of the peseta with respect to a 
basket of currencies (the pound, the dollar and the French franc) and for the rest of the 
period they combined different exchange rate data (the peseta/$ exchange rate and from 
1962, a basket of currencies in which each is weighted by its importance to Spanish 
foreign trade). On the other hand, we have the £/pts rate of exchange from 1850 to 1913 
and the $/pts rate of exchange from Spanish Historical Statistics (EHE).  
More sophisticated data are required to construct the EMP ratio. In reference to 
the anchor currencies, the £/pts rate was considered from 1850 to 1913 and the $/pts 
from 1914 to 2000. Data on short term interest rates for Spain are from EHE and for the 
UK (1850-1913) and the USA (1914-1989) from Homer and Sylla (2005). USA interest 
rate data for the last years (1989-2000) are from the Federal Reserve Statistic Release. 
The  ratio  variation  in  Reserves/M1  is  more  problematic.  In  Spain,  there  is  no 
homogenous series on the variation of reserves from 1850 to 2000. For this reason 
different sources have been used to compile the series. Prados’ (2009) estimate was 
estimate was used for the period 1850 to 1913. This author obtains the variation in 
reserves from a balance of payments estimate. Similar data are not available from 1914 
to 1930, so the Martin Aceña (1985) series on gold reserves was used to obtain reserve 
variations. However, in the years for which we have data for both variables (reserve 
variations from Prados (2009) and gold reserves from Martin Aceña (1985)), significant 26	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
differences  are  observed  between  them.  Taking  this  discontinuity  into  account,  this 
estimate was included in the reserve variation series. EHE provides the data for the 
period from 1931 to 2000, which come from the balance of payments estimate as per 
Prados (2009). For the UK, there is no continuous series either, for which reason reserve 
variations were obtained from data on total reserves from Accominotti, Flandreau and 
Rezzik’s (2010) for the period 1881-1911. Balance of payments data from Mitchell 
(1994) are used for the rest of the years (1912-1994). Finally, for the USA, data from 
the balance of payments provided by US Historical Statistics (1874-1998) were used.  
  Similar problems were encountered with the M1. For Spain, there are data on 
money supply from the EHE. For the UK, the data on M1 are only for the period 1922-
2000 (Mitchell 1994). For the period 1880-1952, data on money supply from Sheppard 
(2006) was used and from 1952 to 2000 from Mitchell (1998). For the US, data on the 
M1 are only from 1915 (Gordon 1986), so the M2 from Gordon (1986) for the period 
1869-1982 and US Historical Statistics (1982-1992) were used as a proxy. For the most 
recent years (1993-2000), data were compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.   
Banking crises 
  Data  on  nominal  bank  stock  prices  came  from  Hoyo  (2007)  and  were  then 
deflated by a CPI from EHE. As regards the number of banks, several sources were 
used: Tortella (1973) for the period 1850-1875, Tedde (1974) for the period 1875-1935, 
EHE (2005) for the period 1939-1975 and Pueyo (2003) for the period 1942-1995. For 
bankruptcies and other qualitative data, such as the name and size of banks that closed, 
data from Martín Aceña, Betrán and Pons (2009) were used. The rest of the variables, 
real banking profitability, change in bank deposits, credits and loans/GDP and credit 
and loans/Deposits, all came from the EHE.  
Stock market crises 
A combination of stock prices in Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao
18 were used for 
the pre-1940 period. These three markets were considered for this period because most 
of the shares quoted in Madrid were bonds until World War I, whereas Barcelona and 
Bilbao were industrial centres representative of the consumer goods industry and heavy 
industry respectively
19. For this reason, Table 9, in order to indentify the main stock 
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18	 ﾠThe data sources for Madrid and Barcelona are the EHE (1850-1913) and Hortalá (2006) for 1913 to 
1936 and Houpt and Rojo Cagigal (2010) for Bilbao. 	 ﾠ
19	 ﾠAccording to Castañeda and Tafunell (2001), the main differences between Barcelona and Madrid are a 
consequence of the different kinds of firms listed on the indexes. The Barcelona index reflected the 
expectations and results of the large companies in the region, whereas Madrid reflected a mixture of 27	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
market crises in Madrid from 1850 to 1940, only considers private securities. However, 
as Madrid included all the major equity trading of the major companies from the 1940s 
onwards, the index is restricted to this market after 1940. 
A nominal arithmetic index is available for Barcelona for the period 1850-1936, which 
was deflated by a consumer price index from the EHE. A nominal arithmetic index is 
also used for the Madrid stock market for the period 1850-1936 and a general total 
return index for the period 1940-2000, all of them deflated by the CPI
20. Finally, an 
unweighted general index from Houpt and Cagival 2010
21 is used in the case of Bilbao 
for the period 1891-1936. This index was also deflated by the CPI. 
Debt crises  
The  data  for  the  public  debt  to  GDP  ratio  are  from  EHE  and  the  data  for 
international defaults come from Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). These data have been 




Exchange rate:  
-Carreras and Tafunell Index: 1850-913 peseta/£ exchange rate, 1914-1936 exchange 
rate of the peseta with respect to a basket of currencies (the pound, the dollar and the 
French franc), 1936-2000 a combination of different exchange rate data (the peseta/$ 
exchange rate and from 1962 a basket of currencies where each currency is weighted by 
its  importance  in  the  Spanish  foreign  trade).  Carreras,  A.  and  Tafunell,  X.  (2003): 
Historia Económica de España. Barcelona. Crítica.  
- 1850-1913 £/pts exchange rate and 1913-2000 $/pts exchange rate, EHE (2005).  
 
EMP index:  
-Interest  rate:  Spain,  EHE  (2005),  the  UK  (1850-1913)  and  the  USA  (1914-1989), 
Homer, S. and Sylla, R. (2005): A History of Interest rates. New Brunswick and New 
Jersey. Rutgers University Press, USA (1989-2000), Federal Reserve Statistic Release.	 ﾠ
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm 
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regional and national forces and the expectations of foreign investors about the Spanish economy. Houp 
and Rojo Cagigal (2010) examined the degree of Spanish capital market integration considering the three 
most  important  exchanges  (Barcelona,  Bilbao  and  Madrid),  obtaining s o m e  e v i d e n c e  o f  m a r k e t  
integration in the 1920s but finding that the markets examined were mainly driven by regional domestic 
forces for the rest of the period. 	 ﾠ
20 Besides stock prices corrected by dividends and increases in capital, this index takes into account the 
reinvestment of dividends. The index expresses the expected returns of the stock market. 	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠThis index includes shares in banks, railways, electricity, mining, shipping and industry (see Houpt and 
Cagival 2010).	 ﾠ28	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-Reserves: Spain, 1850-1913, Prados (2009), 1914-1930, Martin-Aceña, P. (1985): La 
cantidad  de  dinero  en  España,  1900-1935.  Madrid.  Banco  de  España.  Servicio  de 
Estudios, and 1931-2000, EHE (2005). The UK, 1991-1911, Accominotti,O., Flandreau, 
M. and Rezzik’s, R. (2010): “The Spread of Empire: Clio and the Measurement of 
Colonial Borrowing Costs”, forthcoming The Economic History Review, 1912-1994, 
Mitchell,  B.R.  (1994):  International  Historical  Statistics.  Cambridge.  Cambridge 
University  Press.  The  USA,  1874-1998,  Carter,  S.B.,  Gartner,  S.S.,  Haines,  M.R., 
Olmstead, A.L., Sutch, R. and Wright, G. (2006): Historical Statistics of the US. New 
York. Cambridge University Press.  
-M1: Spain, EHE, the UK, 1880-1952, Sheppard, D.K. (2006): The growth and role of 
the UK Financial Institutions. Abingdon. Routledge, 1952-2000, Mitchell, B. R. (1998): 
British Historical Statistics. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, the US, 1869-
1982, Gordon, R. J. (1986): The American Business Cycle. Continuity and Change. 
Chicago  and  London.  The  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1982-1992,  Carter,  S.B., 
Gartner,  S.S.,  Haines,  M.R.,  Olmstead,  A.L.,  Sutch,  R.  and  Wright,  G.  (2006): 
Historical Statistics of the US. New York. Cambridge University Press, 1993-2000, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, http://www.stlouisfed.org/ 
Banking crises:  
-Real bank stock prices: bank stock index Hoyo, A. (2007): Economía y Mercado de 
valores  en  la  España  contemporánea.  La  evolución  de  la  bolsa  antes  del  big  bang 
español, 1831-1988. Santander. Universidad de Cantabria. Prices from EHE (2005). 
-Number  of  banks:  1850-1875  Tortella,  G.  (1973):  Los  orígenes  del  capitalismo  en 
España. Tecnos, 1875-1935 Tedde de Lorca, P. (1974), “La banca privada española 
durante la Restauración, 1874-1914”, en Tortella, G. (dir), La banca española en la 
Restauración.  Banco  de  España,  1939-1975,  EHE  (2005)  and  1942-1995,  Pueyo,  J. 
(2003): Las condiciones de la competencia en la banca española, 1921-1974. Tesis 
Doctoral. Universidad de Barcelona.  
-Bankruptcies, name and size of banks closed: Martín Aceña, P., Betran, C. and Pons, 
M.A. (2009): Financial crises and financial reforms in Spain: what have we learned? 
Working Paper 10-01. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.  
-Real banking profitability: EHE (2005) 
 
-Changes in bank deposits: EHE (2005)  
 
-Other  complementary  ratios  such:  Credits  and  Loans  /GDP  and  Credit  and 
Loans/Deposits. EHE (2005) 
 
Stock Market crises 
-Barcelona:  nominal  arithmetic  index  (Indice  Aritmético  Nominal)  1850-1936,  EHE 
(2005) and prices EHE (2005). 
-Madrid:  nominal  arithmetic  index  (Indice  Aritmético  Nominal)  1850-1936  and  a 
general total return index (Indice General Total ) 1940-2000, EHE (2005) and prices 
EHE (2005). 29	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-Bilbao: Houpt, S. and Rojo-Cagival, J.C. (2010): “Capital market integration in Spain? 
Introducing the Bilbao Stock Exchange, 1891-1936”. Revista de Historia Económica. 
Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, v. 28, issue 3, pp. 535- 573. 


































by periods (II) 
Spanish 
literature 
Bordo et al 
(2001) 
1852                            
                  1883  1883       
1890                       1890    
                  1892  1892       
1898  1898        1899  1899  1899  1899  1898    
1921  1921-22                         
                             
1930-1931  1931-32-33     1930  1934  1934     1930  1931  1931-1932 
                             
   1938                         
   1942  1943  1943  1943  1943  1943  1943       
   1946-47-48                         
1949-1951  1950-51              1954  1954  1948-51    
                             
1957  1958              1958  1958  1958  1958 
1959                 1962  1962       
                             
   1968                    1967  1967 
                        1971  1971 
      1974- 1975  1974- 1975  1974  1974  1974-75  1974-75       
   1978                    1977  1976 
            1980  1980             
   1982-83-84  1985  1985              1982  1982 
            1988  1988             
      1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  1991  1992  1992 
   1994                    1995  1995 
   1998                         
(I)Without 1914-1930 period and (II) With 1914-1930 period. In grey those crises in the limit of acceptance 31	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TABLE 2: Banking crises according to different indicators  
Literature   Real bank stock prices 
Real banking 
profitability  Number of banks 
Change in 
deposits 
 Credit and 
Loans/GDP 
   1859-1860        1861  1857 
1866  1863-66 or 1863-1869     1866-1870  1864 and 1868    
   1871-1874     1874     1870-1872 y 1877 
1881-82        1883-1887  1881-1882  1883 
                 
1890              1890-1892     1891-92 y 1897  1890-1894  1891 -1895 
   1894- 1896        1899    
      1904     1902    
1913-1914  1910-1916  1913-1914  1908 and 1911  1914  1912-1915 
1920     1920  1919       
1924-25        1924-1925  1924-1925  1925 
1931  1928-1932  1931  1929 and 1934-1935  1931  1931 
      1949  1943 and 1944     1944 
      1966  1952-1959       
         1967-72       
1977-1983     1977  1977-1978     1978 
            1992    
 32	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TABLE 3: Main banking crises 
 




*  Change in deposits  
1866  Peak: 1863 
Trough: 1866 
Stock returns: -0.50  
n.a.  Suspension of payments:  
Compañía General de Crédito (Madrid), and Catalana 
General de Crédito and Crédito Mobiliario barcelonés 
(Barcelona) 
1867-1868: -0.12 
1881-1882  Peak: 1882 
Trough:1883 
Stock returns: -0.18 
n.a.  Number of banks: 1882-1887: -22 banks  1882-1883: -0.22 
 
1890  Peak. 1890 
Trough: 1892 
Stock returns: -0.32 
n.a.  Number of banks: 1890-1892: -2 banks  1889-1890: -0.29 
1913-1914  Peak: 1910 
Trough: 1916 
Stock returns: -0.44 
1913: -1.75 
1914: -1.15 
Trouble in the Banco Hispano Americano (1913) and 
Crédito de la Unión Minera (1914) 
1913-1914: -0.11 
1920  Peak: 1919 
Trough: 1920 
Stock returns. -0.13 
1920: -2.62  Suspension of payments: Banco de Barcelona (1920)  1919-1920: 0.19 
1924-1925  Peak: 1922 
Trough: 1924 
Stock returns: -0.04 
1924:-0.25 
1925: 0.0005 
Trouble in the Crédito de la Unión Minera and Banco 
Central 
Number of Banks: 1924-1925: -10 banks 
1926-1925:-0.06 
1931  Peak: 1928 
Trough:1932 
Stock returns: -0.4 
1931: -3.3  Banco de Barcelona bankrupted  
Number of Banks: 
 1930:-3 and 1934-1935: -4 banks 
1930-1931: -0.17 
1977-1983  n.a  1977:-2.02 
1978:-0.54 
1979.-0.50 
24 banking institutions were rescued 
4 were liquidated 
4 merged 
20 small and medium banks were nationalised  
 
1977-1978: 0.17 
n.a.: not available. *Data on number of banks are different according to different sources because for most of the period there is no banking directory that includes all 














Source: see data appendix36	 ﾠ
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TABLE 4: Crisis frequency comparison 
PERIOD  SPAIN  PERIOD  BEKM 
1850-1913  6.3  1880-1913  4.9 
1914-1936  18.2  1919-1939  13.2 
1940-1971  6.5  1945-1971  7 












TABLE 5: Duration and depth of crises in Spain 
SPAIN  1850-1913  1914-1936  1940-1971  1973-2000 
 
Average duration of crises in years 
 
All crisis  2.75  1.5  2  4.5 
Currency  1    2  2.33 
Banking  2  1     
Twin (curr+bank)  6  3    11 
  Average crisis depth (cumulative GDP loss in %) 
All crisis  7.53  4.13  4.79  14.54 
Currency  0.25    4.79  2.86 
Banking  8.17  1.15     
Twin (curr+bank)  13.52  13.04    49.59 
 
Note: Twin is a combination of currency and banking crises. 42	 ﾠ
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TABLE 6: Duration and depth of crises in Spain, by year and type of crisis 






GDP LOSS %) 
1866  Banking  3  14.55 
1882  Twin (currency + banking)  6  13.52 
1890  Banking  1  1.79 
1899  Currency  1  0.25 
Period 1850-1913  2.75  7.53 
1914  Banking  1  3.46 
1921  Banking  1  0 
1924  Banking  1  0 
1931  Twin (currency + banking)  3  13.04 
Period 1914-1936  1.75  4.13 
1943  Currency  1  0 
1958  Currency  3  9.57 
Period 1940-1971  2  4.79 
1976  Twin (currency + banking)  11  49.59 
1982  Currency  1  0 
1991  Currency  4  6.25 
1995  Currency  2  2.33 
Period 1973-2000  4.5  14.54 
 
  43	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
 
TABLE 7: Output loss (% GDP) 
PERIOD  SPAIN  PERIOD  BEKM 
1850-1913  7.53  1880-1913  9.8 
1914-1936  4.13  1919-1939  13.4 
1940-1971  4.79  1945-1971  5.2 






TABLE 8: Stock market crises according to the peak to trough 
method 
            Stock market period 
 
Assigned year to the stock 
market crisis 
1852-55 and 1856-59*  1855 
1861-66 and 1967-69*  1865 
1871-74  1874 
1881-87  1882 
1890-92  1892 
 1902-06**    1905 
1910-14   1912 
1915-22  1918 
1928-34  1930 
1935-40  n.d. 
1947-50  1948 
1956-60  1959 
1974-80  1976 
1989-92  1992 
 
Note: * we have jointed these two crises because there was only one year of growth in 









Number  Peak  Trough  Stock returns 
  1  1861  1869  -0.58 
  2  1871  1874  -0.35 
  3  1890  1892  -0.29 
  4  1902  1906  -0.62 
  5  1910  1914  -0.51 
  6  1915  1922  -0.65 
  7  1928  1934  -0.65 
  8  1935            1940  -0.43* 
  9  1947  1950  -0.62 
  10  1956  1960  -0.35 
  11  1974  1980
+  -1.44 
  12  1989  1992
++  -0.33 
Barcelona 
(1850-1936) 
Number  Peak  Trough  Stock returns 
  1  1852  1859  -0.66 
  2  1861  1868  -1.02 
  3  1881  1887  -0.70 
  4  1889  1893  -0.35 
  5  1916  1921  -0.51 
  6  1928  1932  -0.57 
Bilbao  (1891-
1936) 
Number  Peak  Trough  Stock returns 
  1  1900  1902
+++  -0.26 
  2  1912  1914  -0.38 
  3  1919  1921  -0.73 
  4  1928  1932  -0.51 
TOTAL   14 (we considered the 1900-02 Bilbao crisis together with 1902-06 
Madrid crisis) 
 
Note: Data for Madrid from refer to the period 1850-2000, for Barcelona to the period 1850-1913 and for 
Bilbao, 1891-1936. * There are no data; the returns are interpolated from Barro and Ursúa (2009).+ it 
could be considered until 1982, ++ it could be considered until 1994, +++ it could be considered until 
1904, as in Madrid. Total refers to the total number of crises which are in different years. We consider 
there is only one stock market crisis when various overlapping or adjacent years are involved. 
Sources: See text and data appendix. 46	 ﾠ
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GDP PERIOD  GDP 
CONTRACTION 
COMMENTS 
1852-59  -0.66  1855-57  -0.06  Only in Barcelona. We 
join the 1852-1855 and 
1856-59  crises  because 
there  is  only  one  year 
with an increase. 
1861-69  -0.58  1863-68  -0.10  We  join  the  1861-66 
and  1867-69  crises 
because  there  is  only 
one  year  with  an 
increase.  
In  Barcelona  1861-
1866. 
No data in Bilbao 
 
1871-74  -0.35  1873-74  -0.09  Only  in  Madrid.  No 
data in Bilbao 
    1877-79  -0.09   
1881-87  -0.70  1884-87  -0.08  Only in Barcelona 
1890-92  -0.29      In Barcelona 1889-
1993. Not in Bilbao 
    1892-96  -0.14   
1900-02  -0.26      Only in Bilbao. 
We  consider  until 
1904,  being  the  same 
as  in  Madrid  for  the 
period 1902-1904 
1902-06  -0.63  1901-05  -0.07  Not in Barcelona 
1910-14  -0.51  1909-14  -0.08  Bilbao 1912-14. Not in 
Barcelona 
1915-22  -0.65  1916-22  -0.03  Bilbao  1919-21. 
Barcelona 1916-1921. 
1928-34  -0.65  1929-33  -0.09  Bilbao  1928-32. 
Barcelona 1928-1932 
1935-40  -0.43*  1935-38**  -0.33   
1947-50  -0.62  1947-49  -0.02  No  data  in  Barcelona 
and Bilbao 
1956-60  -0.35  1958-59  -0.03  No  data  in  Barcelona 
and Bilbao 
1974-80  -1.44  1980-81   -0.00055  No  data  in  Barcelona 
and Bilbao 
1989-92  -0.33      No  data  in  Barcelona 
and Bilbao 
Note: Stock market crises are cumulative multi-year returns of -0.250 or less. GDP contractions are 
cumulative multi-year declines of at  l east  0. 10.  GDP i s r eal  GDP per  capi t a.  The GDP reduction is 
included when the GDP period coincides with a peak-to-trough period in the years around or adjacent to 
it. When a stock market crisis coincides in several places, the Madrid fall in stock returns is considered.* 
There are no data; returns are interpolated from Barro and Ursúa (2009), which are calculated over the 
period that bridged the gap in the annual data.**Coincides with the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). 
Sources: see text and data appendix 47	 ﾠ
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TABLE 11: Depressions with and without stock-market crisis 
 
Panel A: Stock market crisis and Depressions. Number: 3 
Stock Market 
period 
Stock prices or 
returns  GDP period  GDP contraction 
Comments 
1861-69  -0.58  1863-68  -0.098 
Considered  in  the 
count 
1928-34  -0.65  1929-33  -0.095 
Considered  in  the 
count 
1935-40*  -0.43  1935-38**  -0.331 
Considered  in  the 
count 
Panel B: Depressions without Stock Market Crisis. Number: 1   
Stock Market 
period 
Stock prices or 
returns  GDP period  GDP contraction 
Comments 
   
1877-79  -0.091 
Near to a contraction. 
Not considered in the 
count due to being 
below -0.095 
   
1892-96  -0.136 
Considered in the 
count 
Panel C: Stock Market crisis without Depressions. Number: 10   
Stock Market 
period 
Stock prices or 
returns  GDP period  GDP contraction 
Comments 
1852-59  -0.6562  1855-57  -0.060  Only in Barcelona 
1871-74  -0.36  1873-74  -0.087  Near to a contraction 
1881-87  -0.70  1884-87  -0.078  Only in Barcelona 
1902-06  -0.63  1901-05  -0.066  Not in Barcelona 
1910-14  -0.51  1909-14  -0.076  Not in Barcelona 
1915-22  -0.65  1916-22  -0.033   
1947-50  -0.62  1947-49  -0.019 
No data in Barcelona 
and Bilbao 
1956-60  -0.35  1958-59  -0.031 
No data in Barcelona 
and Bilbao 
1974-80  -1.44  1980-81  -0.00055 
No data in Barcelona 
and Bilbao 
1989-92  -0.33     
No data in Barcelona 
and Bilbao 
 
Note: St o c k  ma r k e t  c r i s i s  a r e  c u mu l a t i v e  mu l t i-year  returns  of  -0.250  or  less.  GDP  contractions  are 
cumulative multi-year declines of at  l east  0. 10.  GDP i s r eal  GDP per  capi t a.  The GDP reduction is 
included when the GDP period coincides with a peak-to-trough period in the years around or adjacent to 
it. * There are no data; returns are interpolated from Barro and Ursúa (2009), which are calculated over 
the period that bridged the gap in the annual data.**Coincides with the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). 
Sources: see text and data appendix 48	 ﾠ
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TABLE 12: Frequency of stock market crashes and depressions 
 
Number of events 
Total non-war and war period  Stock Market crashes  Depressions  	 ﾠBoth 
Spain (1850-2000)  14  4  3 
USA (1869-2006)  7  2  2 
25 countries (1869-2006) 
 










18 OECD countries (1869-2006) 
 











Spain (1850-2000)  13  3  2 
25 countries (1869-2006) 







18 OECD countries 








Spain (1850-2000)  1  1  1 
25 countries (1869-2006) 







18 OECD countries 








Note: * War periods are limited to active combatants.  
Source: For Spain, see text and data appendix. For USA, 25 countries and 18 OECD countries in Barro 
and Ursúa (2009). 49	 ﾠ
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TABLE 13: Main debt crises (debt over 100%) 








  1850  1851  1936-1939 
    1837-1867   
1874-1881  1868-1882  1877-1882   
1899-1909  1896-1909  1959, 1960 and 
1978* 
 












TABLE 14: Duration and depth of crises in Spain with all type of crises 
SPAIN  1850-1913  1914-1936  1940-1971  1973-2000 
 
Average duration of crises in years 
 
All crisis  2.83  1.75  2.33  4.5 
Currency  1    1  1.5 
Banking    1     
Stock market  1    3   
Twin1 (curr+bank)         
Twin 2 (bank+stock)  2.5  1.5     
Twin 3 (curr+stock)      3  4 
Triple (curr+bank + stock)  6  3    11 
  Average crisis depth (cumulative GDP loss in %) 
All crisis  11.15  4.13  5.85  14.54 
Currency  0.25    0  1.17 
Banking    0     
Stock market  7.28    7.97   
Twin1 (curr+bank)         
Twin 2 (bank+stock)  14.94  1.73     
Twin 3 (curr+stock)      9.57  6.25 
Triple (curr+bank+stock)  13.52  9.57    49.59 
 
Note: Twin 1 is a combination of currency and banking crises. Twin 2 is a combination of banking and 
stock market crises. Twin 3 is a combination of currency and stock market crises. Triple is a combination 
of currency, banking and stock market crises. 53	 ﾠ
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TABLE 15: Duration and depth of crises in Spain by year and type of crisis considering all 
types of crises 
 






GDP LOSS %) 
1855  Stock Market  3  8.71 
1866  Twin 2 (banking + stock market)  3  14.55 
1874  Stock Market  1  14.55 
1882  Triple (currency + banking + stock market)  6  13.52 
1892*  Twin 2 (banking + stock market)  2  15.32 
1899  Currency  1  0.25 
1905  Stock Market  1  0 
Period 1850-1913  2.83  11.15 
1914  Twin 2 (banking + stock market)  2  3.46 
1921  Twin 2 (banking + stock market)  1  0 
1924  Banking  1  0 
1931  Triple (currency + banking + stock market)  3  13.04 
Period 1914-1936  1.75  4.13 
1943  Currency  1  0 
1948  Stock Market  3  7.97 
1958  Twin 3 ( currency + stock market)  3  9.57 
Period 1940-1971  2.33  5.85 
1976  Triple (currency + banking + stock market)  11  49.59 
1982  Currency  1  0 
1991  Twin 3 (currency + stock market)  4  6.25 
1995  Currency  2  2.33 
Period 1973-2000  4.5  14.54 
 
Note: Twin 1 is a combination of currency and banking crises. Twin 2 is a combination of banking and 
stock market crises. Twin 3 is a combination of currency and stock market crises. Triple is a combination 
of currency, banking and stock market crises. * 1892 stock market crisis and 1890 banking crisis. 
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